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Cyberspace is emerging as a new battlefield, as cyber attacks can now complement 
state conflicts. The recent cyber feud between the US and Russia, in which the for-
mer openly accused the latter of deliberate and orchestrated hacking activities to 
undermine the integrity of the just-concluded US presidential election, did not come 
as a surprise. As we witness traditional activities increasingly shifting to this new 
domain, cyberspace is becoming a focal point not only for beneficial innovations, 
enterprises and social networking, but also a site for criminality and warfare (Acker-
man, 2016; Lewis, 2011). These latter features are reshaping and redefining the dig-
ital space as an environment not only for progress and prosperity, but also for cyber 
threats. Meanwhile, many countries, especially in Africa, are embracing emerging 
trends in cyber space with little insight as to where certain of the trends may lead. 
The question is: In Africa, how aware are we of cyber conflicts and the possible mag-
nitude of cyber warfare?
Unlike a decade ago, cyber warfare is no longer a strange or mystifying notion.  With 
the emerging reality of nation-state-supported attacks on the digital infrastructure of 
other nations, the entrenchment of the relatively new phenomenon of cyber warfare 
in the human lexicon cannot be contested. Like any new concept, there is no agreed 
definition of cyber warfare (Applegate, 2011). As a basis for this discussion, we define 
cyber warfare as cyberspace-based conspiracy and conflict, usually including politi-
cally-motivated attacks on information systems and networks, targeted at a nation or 
nations (Betz & Stevens, 2011; Capaccio, 2012). It is a deliberate action by a nation 
state (or nation states), or by an organised group (or groups), against a state (or states) 
that is aimed at disrupting or harming critical national infrastructure (CNI) in ways 
that can bring the infrastructure to a standstill (O’Connell, 2012). 
Cyberspace has evolved into a critical domain that countries can no longer take with 
levity, and that many countries are working hard to control and/or dominate. Besides 
the threats from financial fraudsters or groups, there are deliberate efforts by nation 
states to dominate and show supremacy over other states’ information spaces, with 
the potential to negatively impact economic, political or military activities. Cyber 
warfare from this perspective is, perhaps, an extension of the shared notion of con-
spiracy and sabotage between and among nations that one finds in conventional 
battles (Betz & Stevens, 2011). 
In cyberspace, which is intrinsically challenged by uncertainties, nation state actors 
are increasingly dissatisfied with building defensive strategies alone, and are working 
to build offensive capabilities that can assail their adversaries when desired (Capac-
cio, 2012, Bamford, 2013). Cyber war is part of an underground and obscure arms 
race, where nations invest billions of dollars to establish digital armies and stocks of 
digital weapons – for example malicious software codes that are politically motivat-
ed, as exemplified by the Stuxnet worm that disrupted and disabled the centrifugal 
equipment of an Iranian nuclear facility (Langner, 2013). Exacerbating the potential 
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dangers of cyber warfare is the fact that no individual, organisation or government 
can provide an accurate profile of the vulnerability, threat and risk landscapes evolv-
ing in, and emanating from, cyberspace (Mbanaso & Dandaura, 2015; Parks & Dug-
gan, 2011). 
What may now be considered historic examples of cyber warfare include the as-
sault, allegedly by Russia, on the Baltic state of Estonia in 2007 (BBC, 2007), which 
disrupted civilian services. The attacks, which disrupted public web resources, in-
cluding the Estonian Parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers and broadcasters, 
was allegedly prompted by a feud regarding the relocation of the Bronze Soldier of 
Tallinn (The Economist, 2010). This attack, which was the first known cyber attack 
of such magnitude targeted at a nation state, and which used the distributed denial 
of service (DDoS) method, sparked worldwide concern.  The cyber attack on an 
Iranian nuclear facility in 2010, suspected to have been carried out jointly by the US 
and Israel (Langner, 2013), and various attacks on US interests, allegedly by China 
and North Korea (Perlrothoct, 2012), are other prominent examples of cyber attack 
exploits. (Much earlier in cyber history, many years before the public Internet, there 
were alleged cyber attacks on the US National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA) network, using the WANK worm in 1989, to protest against nuclear 
programmes (Applegate, 2011)).  
The aftermath of the attack on the 2010 Iranian nuclear facility brought a ferocious 
response from the Iranian state (Perlrothoct, 2012). Iran launched its cyber count-
er-offensive against Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as well as American networks. Having 
boasted of possessing a strong cyber army, Iran carried out these attacks on perceived 
adversaries to buttress a point (Perlrothoct, 2012).  
The December 2014 attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, allegedly committed by 
North Korea, was of a magnitude capable of provoking a cyber war. The perpetuators 
of the Sony assault revealed embarrassing documents, whereby sensitive private and 
personal information of employees of Sony, amongst other critical data, was com-
promised. The Sony attack raised public uproar in the US, and the US government 
was clearly perturbed by the incident. North Korea, undoubtedly a strong aggressor 
in cyberspace, has continued to assemble a sophisticated cyber army for its offen-
sive and defensive strategies (Kwark, 2015). In a similar vein, China has, undeniably, 
repeatedly invaded US cyberspace, exploiting vulnerabilities in certain military and 
government information systems and networks (Capaccio, 2012). Experts argue that 
most of the Chinese attacks are highly customised and specialised, with a high suc-
cess rate, targeted at vital military installations, mostly vulnerable to industrial espi-
onage (Bowlsbey, 2016; INFOSEC Institute, 2013). 
Countries already drawn into cyber conspiracy and conflicts include the US, China, 
the UK, Israel, North Korea, Iran and Russia, all of whom are making serious coordi-
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nated national efforts with respect to defensive and offensive capabilities. There are 
indications that the US National Security Agency (NSA) conceived the "US Cyber 
Command" as early as the year 2000, in order to build the US cyber warfare effort 
(Bamford, 2013). In his account, Bamford states that the US fears that “cyberweap-
ons are as crucial to 21st century warfare as nuclear arms were in the 20th” (Bam-
ford, 2013). Currently, it is estimated that the US Cyber Command force has over 
14,000 personnel with over 13 formidable cyber attack formations (Bamford, 2013). 
Furthermore, the US is one of those countries that has continued to invest in cyber 
activities, as it is purported that the US sets aside about USD4.7 billion annually for 
developing cyber warriors, including expertise development via encouragement of 
doctoral degree studies in the various fields of cyberspace (Bamford, 2013; Miller, 
2016). China, meanwhile, is building its cyber warfare paramilitary forces, under-
stood to be especially targeting US expertise and specialisations in communications, 
electronic warfare and networking (Capaccio, 2012). 
According a former UK Defence Secretary, “we will build in Britain a cyber strike 
capability so we can strike back in cyberspace against enemies who attack us, put-
ting cyber alongside land, sea, air and space as a mainstream military activity” (UK 
Government, 2013). From the foregoing, the general concern is that the rise in cy-
ber conspiracy and conflicts is capable of provoking a full-scale conventional war or 
cyber war, or a combination of the two. And there is already evidence that nation 
states or organised groups can launch digital assaults in the context of political and/
or economic disputes. The potential for cyber conflict is no longer uncertain. Rather, 
the uncertainty is: who will be drawn into the cyber battlefields, and when and how? 
The cyber conflicts trend is increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication and severity 
of impact (Ranger, 2015), and the outcomes may be grave. 
This widening of the elements of the digital divide – now including the ability to 
participate on the cyber warfare battlefield – is yet to be recognised by many devel-
oping nations, including many nations in Africa, who are encumbered by pressing 
domestic problems and socio-economic challenges. These local issues have, unavoid-
ably, distracted attention from the emerging threats of the digital world (Epstein, 
Nisbet, & Gillespie, 2011; Mbanaso & Dandaura, 2015). With the scale of the events 
that are unfolding, it is fast becoming a necessity that every nation recognise the crit-
icality of cyberspace as a domain of warfare. This requires African leaders to appreci-
ate the urgent requirement to incorporate this domain into their traditional military 
operations of land, sea, air and space, making cyber conflict strategy an integral part 
of overall military strategy, with proportionate investment. Whether African leaders 
consider cyber warfare or not, the African continent will not be immune to cyber 
conspiracy and conflicts. And while cyber warfare could potentially become deeply 
embedded in contemporary military operations, there is at present no international 
convention on this matter.
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The wars that rage in the cyberspace domain are likely to be very difficult to contain, 
due to several fluid factors. The factors that interplay and create the vulnerability 
landscape, which could be exploited by any invader against a target, are inherently 
unpredictable, increasing in severity as advancements are made in the technology 
arena (Lewis, 2011). A characteristic of cyber warfare is the minimal risk, and rel-
atively low-cost weapons, required by an attacker to inflict significant impact on a 
target (Applegate, 2011). Another advantageous factor for attackers is the high level 
of anonymity and deniability afforded by conducting war-like campaigns in cyber-
space (Applegate, 2011). 
Conventionally, countries build “special forces”, usually small formations of high-
ly-skilled specialists who are seen as superior to all other forces. Combatting cyber 
warfare will need to fall into the category of matters engaged with by such forces, 
with lessons drawn from traditional special-force experiences. What are the com-
monalities and similarities between special forces and cyber forces? Several countries 
have dedicated vulnerability researchers combing cyberspace in an attempt to discov-
er new weaknesses, as advances in technology characteristically breed new vulnera-
bilities (INFOSEC Institute, 2013; Shen & Nettis, 2016). 
Another key point that should be understood in this context is the nature of the con-
spiracy and conflicts, which is, fundamentally, knowledge-based (Parks & Duggan, 
2011; Shen & Nettis, 2016). It is not going to be business as usual, i.e., not a matter 
of buying tanks and weapons, as was the case in the traditional arms race. What is 
key, in this context, is the ability to carry out intellectual exploits, the capability to 
latch onto inherent vulnerabilities within cyberspace, through intensified and struc-
tured discovery, i.e., the ability of invaders to identify high-profile vulnerabilities, 
which even the vendors and manufacturers of technological devices and services find 
difficult to ascertain. The strength of every invader lies in its skills, expertise and 
competence in discovering high-profile, zero-day vulnerabilities. What this entails, 
as a knowledge-based event, is understanding that the threats are not static, but 
rapidly evolving, which makes reliance on other countries to supply cyber arms and 
cyber weapons a dangerous game (Capaccio, 2012; Parks & Duggan, 2011).
While some experts have argued that cyber war is unlikely on the scale speculat-
ed (Rid, 2011), there are pointers to the contrary. Presently, China and the US are 
in what can be qualified as conspiracy and cyber conflicts, with Chinese nationals 
already arrested for committing industrial espionage (Bowlsbey, 2016; INFOSEC 
Institute, 2013). Russia has been observed using massive cyber offensives to threaten 
its former allies, especially the Ukraine and Estonia (Applegate, 2011; BBC, 2007). 
North Korea is constantly using cyber offensives against South Korea (Kwark, 2015; 
Sang-hun, 2013; Reuters, 2016). To sum up, many of the conspiracies and conflicts 
seen among nations in the offline realm have shifted to cyberspace. The same sorts of 
conspirators, alignments and disagreements witnessed offline in past decades appear 
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to dominate, and even become magnified, in cyberspace. 
The common denominator is that open, borderless cyberspace is a level playing 
ground for those who choose to invest in it. In the near future, nations’ successes will 
be determined by their capacity and capability to maintain competitive advantage 
in the information space, i.e., cyber power capability. War based on cyber power 
capability will be difficult for any one side to win decisively except, perhaps, when 
combined with conventional warfare.  
What may be most disturbing is the inconspicuous nature of nation states’ capability, 
as there is no formal way to assess the true cyber offensive capability of a nation. 
Unlike the nuclear arms race that can possibly be assessed and constrained, nation 
states’ particular cyber warfare capabilities can lie undetected. Moreover, the absence 
of international rules of engagement means that any full-scale cyber warfare has no 
recourse to any international law, even when it can have debilitating effects. While 
hacking of networks and information systems is an illegal activity, there is no inter-
national law addressing the use of cyber power against a state (Applegate, 2011). 
Another perspective is that, as alluded to above, the cost of acquiring cyber weapons 
is relatively cheap, suggesting that poor states can invest little and harvest more, in 
terms of impact, in the cyber warfare arena. And with the borderless Internet charac-
teristic of anonymity and deniability, nations in conflict can easily draw support from 
allies, since attribution is difficult. 
Accordingly, based on this brief introductory overview, it is my view that studies in 
cyber security and cyber conflict must henceforth become a significant component 
of digital transformation research on the African continent.
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